Titlebook: Network Games, Control, and Optimization; Proceedings of NETGC Samson Lasaulce,Tania Jimenez,Eilon Solan Conference proceedings 2017 Spring

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書目名稱Network Games, Control, and Optimization影響因子(影響力)




書目名稱Network Games, Control, and Optimization影響因子(影響力)學科排名




書目名稱Network Games, Control, and Optimization網(wǎng)絡公開度




書目名稱Network Games, Control, and Optimization網(wǎng)絡公開度學科排名




書目名稱Network Games, Control, and Optimization被引頻次




書目名稱Network Games, Control, and Optimization被引頻次學科排名




書目名稱Network Games, Control, and Optimization年度引用




書目名稱Network Games, Control, and Optimization年度引用學科排名




書目名稱Network Games, Control, and Optimization讀者反饋




書目名稱Network Games, Control, and Optimization讀者反饋學科排名

harbinger

休戰(zhàn)

Multi-Games for LTE and WiFi Coexistence over Unlicensed Channels,r the latter, the existence of a unique Debreu equilibrium is proved while for the matching game the existence of core stable outcome is shown and a decentralized algorithm that converges to the stable outcome is proposed.

生氣的邊緣

2363-8516 ing importance of network control and optimization in many nThis contributed volume offers a collection of papers presented at the 2016 Network Games, Control, and Optimization conference (NETGCOOP), held at the University of Avignon in France, November 23-25, 2016. ?These papers highlight the incre

蘆筍

Conference proceedings 2017e University of Avignon in France, November 23-25, 2016. ?These papers highlight the increasing importance of network control and optimization in many networking application domains, such as mobile and fixed access networks, computer networks, social networks, transportation networks, and, more rece

Chauvinistic

Finite Improvement Property in a Stochastic Game Arising in Competition over Popularity in Social Nt property holds on the best response pure policies which implies the existence of pure equilibria. We further show that all pure equilibria are fully ordered in the performance they provide to the players and we propose a procedure to obtain the best equilibrium.

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FANG

An Energy-Efficiency Game in Relay-Assisted D2D Networks with Malicious Devices,terference. We show the existence of a unique Nash Equilibrium (NE) in the defined energy efficiency game. We also numerically evaluate the effect of malicious devices on the energy efficiency of the regular devices.

休息

Minimally Intrusive Server Policies for Background Data Transfers,ment and is based on water-filling, converges to the optimal as the number of bottleneck links increases. Using simulations we compare the performance of this policy with the standard case where no control is exercised by the server.

Itinerant