| 書目名稱 | Mobilization Constraints and Military Privatization |
| 副標題 | The Political Cost-E |
| 編輯 | Eugenio Cusumano |
| 視頻video | http://file.papertrans.cn/636/635674/635674.mp4 |
| 概述 | Investigates the link between domestic political constraints and democracies’ use of private military contractors.Conceptualizes military privatization as a politically rather than financially cost-ef |
| 圖書封面 |  |
| 描述 | .This book investigates the connection between tightening mobilization constraints and the use of PMSCs in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Italy.?Drawing on neoclassical realism and institutionalist theory, it conceptualizes democracies’ use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) as an attempt to circumvent the tightening constraints on the mobilization of military power. The use of private military contractors is less subjected to parliamentary restrictions and less visible to public opinion than the deployment of soldiers. Rather than cheaper in financial terms, PMSCs are therefore politically cost-effective, as they enable decision-makers to minimize the institutional obstacles on conducting military operations and the electoral costs attached thereto. The need to reduce the?.ex ante.?hurdles and the?.ex post?.costs of military deployments fills the blind spots of alternative explanations for the use of PMSCs based on effectiveness, ideology, and organizational interests.. |
| 出版日期 | Book 2023 |
| 關鍵詞 | security; international security; military; Mobilization Constraints; Military Privatization |
| 版次 | 1 |
| doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16423-1 |
| isbn_softcover | 978-3-031-16425-5 |
| isbn_ebook | 978-3-031-16423-1 |
| copyright | The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerl |
|Archiver|手機版|小黑屋|
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