找回密碼
 To register

QQ登錄

只需一步,快速開(kāi)始

掃一掃,訪問(wèn)微社區(qū)

打印 上一主題 下一主題

Titlebook: Microeconomic Theory; Susheng Wang Textbook 2018Latest edition Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2018 Microeconomic theory.Game theory.Ge

[復(fù)制鏈接]
31#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 23:28:34 | 只看該作者
General Equilibrium Theoryt is, consumers and producers take prices as given and choose their best actions based on their own budget/resource constraints. In this chapter, all prices are endogenous and they adjust to clear all markets. An equilibrium is reached when all markets are clear and when no one wants to change anymo
32#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 02:59:41 | 只看該作者
Cooperative Gamescommon objective, but they may bargain over the sharing of benefits, just like the OPEC. They may form coalitions to cooperate within a coalition but compete between coalitions, just like political parties in practice. They may also seek third-party coordination, such as arbitration and government s
33#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 06:49:09 | 只看該作者
Market Informationmplete information, incomplete markets, and incentives. This and the next chapters will focus on incomplete information as a possible cause for market failures. We deal with competitive firms in this chapter and monopolies in the next chapter.
34#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 10:13:54 | 只看該作者
35#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 16:50:05 | 只看該作者
36#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 18:26:03 | 只看該作者
37#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 22:48:17 | 只看該作者
Incentive Contractsact. In this type of problem, information is symmetric: both the employer and the employee have the same set of information. But a third party, the court, cannot observe the information. So the issue here is: how does the employer provide sufficient incentives in a contract to motivate the employee?
38#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 03:05:24 | 只看該作者
2192-4333 theory, information economics, and contract theory.? The revamped, 3rd edition of "Microeconomic Theory" offers faculty, graduate and upper undergraduate students with a comprehensive curriculum solution.?.978-981-13-4316-2978-981-13-0041-7Series ISSN 2192-4333 Series E-ISSN 2192-4341
39#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 08:50:37 | 只看該作者
40#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 11:48:46 | 只看該作者
 關(guān)于派博傳思  派博傳思旗下網(wǎng)站  友情鏈接
派博傳思介紹 公司地理位置 論文服務(wù)流程 影響因子官網(wǎng) 吾愛(ài)論文網(wǎng) 大講堂 北京大學(xué) Oxford Uni. Harvard Uni.
發(fā)展歷史沿革 期刊點(diǎn)評(píng) 投稿經(jīng)驗(yàn)總結(jié) SCIENCEGARD IMPACTFACTOR 派博系數(shù) 清華大學(xué) Yale Uni. Stanford Uni.
QQ|Archiver|手機(jī)版|小黑屋| 派博傳思國(guó)際 ( 京公網(wǎng)安備110108008328) GMT+8, 2025-10-6 14:48
Copyright © 2001-2015 派博傳思   京公網(wǎng)安備110108008328 版權(quán)所有 All rights reserved
快速回復(fù) 返回頂部 返回列表
桃江县| 珠海市| 台中市| 社旗县| 延长县| 汨罗市| 英山县| 蕉岭县| 商丘市| 东阳市| 岑溪市| 泗洪县| 福鼎市| 客服| 古田县| 石柱| 昌吉市| 射洪县| 松溪县| 鹰潭市| 台南市| 濮阳市| 渭南市| 连云港市| 西昌市| 镇赉县| 义马市| 天祝| 延边| 宝丰县| 博爱县| 沙洋县| 拉萨市| 合阳县| 井陉县| 绍兴市| 乌兰浩特市| 湖北省| 弋阳县| 保德县| 商洛市|