Titlebook: Methodology, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Science; Essays in Honour of Carl G. Hempel,Hilary Putnam,Wilhelm K. Essler Book 1983 Springe

熱情的我

Quines Ontologiekriterium, a theory. Two versions (K1), (K2) of the criterion are elaborated, (K2) being the more adequate one which is shown through a number of theorems for each version. Part II contains a critical discussion of (K2), in particular of the question wether (K2) is a criterion for . presuppositions, i.e. for

不要不誠實

Minatory

,Moralbegründung Ohne Metaphysik,al imperatives, addressed to each member of the society in question. The main presuppositions of this conception of morality are analysed and the implications of it for the relations between morality on the one hand and such things as prudence, sanctions, and equality on the other are examined.

引導(dǎo)

,Probability as a Quasi-Theoretical Concept — J.V. Kries’ Sophisticated Account after a Century,bilistic terms. Subjectivism, defended by Keynes, Savage and many other mathematicians and philosophers, and the objectivist frequentist interpretation by v. Mises, Reichenbach and a majority of natural scientists have been involved in an irreconcilable struggle against each other for more than half

subordinate

Valuations for Direct Propositional Logic, sequential calculus. With its rules the truth-value (true (t) or false (f)) of the consequent can be determined from the truth-values of the premisses. In this way the semantical stipulations are formulated constructively as in a calculus of natural deduction, i.e. semantics itself is a formal syst

拋射物

Instantaneous

On How the Distinction between History and Philosophy of Science Should not be Drawn, very general terms, both disciplines have the same subject matter, namely the bulk of science. Speaking in more particular terms, they still appear to coincide in their subjects: namely, particular components of science, like concepts, principles, methods, theories and research programs. Consequent

星球的光亮度

下垂

photopsia

A Modest Concept of Moral Sense Perception,ks on moral sense intuitionism and may, in my opinion, be regarded as its plausible core. I shall unballast it in a way which will, I hope, prove healthy: I shall avoid any talk of feelings and intuitions. I think that the concept of a moral sense has to do no more with feelings and intuitions than