Titlebook: Metaepistemology and Relativism; J. Adam Carter Book 2016 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016 epistemology.knowledge.real

Abbreviate

Grating

法律的瑕疵

Incommensurability, Circularity and Epistemic Relativism,ut perceptual warrant (e.g. Pryor 2000; 2004; Wright 2008). It is concluded that, while incommensurability arguments can lay claim to a serious threat to the . of our attempts to justify our epistemic principles, this threat to cogency fails to motivate epistemic relativism over dogmatist, conservativist or sceptical alternatives.

hypnotic

Metaepistemology and Relativism,ind of relevance to mainstream epistemology, even if more traditional arguments of the sort canvassed in Chapters 3–5 do not. Though the . of relevance is — I’ll argue — of a very different sort than is ordinarily thought.

鋼筆記下懲罰

SHOCK

Global Relativism, dividing line in contemporary thinking about relativism between Boghossian (2006a) and Wright (2008). The conclusion reached in this chapter is that global relativism is ultimately not a defensible view, though this is hardly because (as is often thought) it can be dismissed with a quick ‘knock-down’.

META

Metaepistemology and Realism,ter does two central things. The first is to develop a reasoned way of locating revealed second-order commitments in metaepistemology by looking straight to paradigmatic first-order disagreements, and to what is common ground to these disagreements. The second is to show that a pervasive element of

intention

內(nèi)部

流眼淚

Incommensurability, Circularity and Epistemic Relativism,f epistemic systems. Such arguments can usefully be understood as beginning in the same place as dialogic arguments. But rather than to attempt, as dialogic arguments did, to establish the epistemic relativist’s conclusion by appealing to dialogue facts, incommensurability arguments attempt to get t