Titlebook: Meinong’s Theory of Knowledge; Marie-Luise Schubert Kalsi Book 1987 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1987 Bertrand Russell.Ernst Mac

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澄清

ctical presentation with examples from C, Java and Eiffel.Ot.Distributed processing has a strong theoretical foundation, but many day-to-day practitioners make limited use of the advantages this theory can give them. The result includes unreliable systems with obscure and intermittent failures, that

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dura-mater

Perception,owing and that which is known. In the beginning there is perception and its object.. This relationship is a “basic fact,” and the theory of knowledge must state it as such. “It cannot be defined what the object of our knowledge of reality is, it can only be experienced.” That is the problem of trans

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Time and the Temporal,h the apprehension of past objects, that is, objects which occurred at a different time than their apprehension. The problem is to find an explanation for how objects which differ temporally are presented, how at all objects are dated in their presentation.

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Fantasy,sy idea, the word ‘fantas’ has, as everyone knows, a very different meaning in its common-sense psychological use from the use in the language of psychology proper. But the common-sense needs are not foreign to the specialist, and he is in need of a replacement for the common word ‘fantasy’ in favor

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開始從未

On Evidence,ered throughout his works, we must be ready to expect that evidence is associated either with objects, that is, states of affairs, or objectives or with our experiences which present these objects. If evidence is present in or with objects it is absolute and objective. (In that case it would be simi

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3641-6Bertrand Russell; Ernst Mach; Europe; German; Immanuel Kant; empiricism; issue; memory; object; philosophy; ph

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978-94-010-8129-0Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1987