Titlebook: Mathematical Modelling in Economics; Essays in Honor of W W. Erwin Diewert,Klaus Spremann,Frank Stehling Book 1993Latest edition Springer-V

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Gustav Feichtinger to be one of the most powerful instruments of the 21st century for ‘increasing transparency in the conduct of the powerful, access to information, and for facilitating active citizen participation in building democratic societies’ (La Rue, 2011, p. 4). As an example, the rapporteur highlighted the

致命

Helmut Funke,Katja Lampe,Bernhard Oltdian definitional scheme, then how are we to define it? If we look to modern rights theory could it be defined as a will or an interest theory of rights? Will theories may look promising at first glance because of their insistence that rights are under the control of the right-holder who may exercis

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Wulf Gaertnerelves that comprises the aggregate right of nature. Then we conform to the second law of nature and go through the process of transferring and laying down those rights that we would not want others to hold against us. Where does this leave the Hobbesian individual with regard to her rights? She now

Exonerate

Mystic

Constituent-Sensitive Public Fund Sharingtroversial, however, how the states’ shares of public funds should be determined. We modify an earlier axiomatic approach to this problem. In particular we allow for state-specific equalization functions. It turns out, among others, that now different lump sum payments to the states may be made whic

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glans-penis

Samuelson’s “Shibboleth” Revisited: Proportional Budgeting Among Agents and Rank-Two Demand Systemsr a proportion of its total expenditure that is independent of income but not necessarily independent of prices—a procedure that we call proportional budgeting. The restrictions turn out to be closely related to the results of recent research on weaker forms of aggregation across agents (aggregation

柳樹；枯黃

Heresy

Social Preferences as Optimal Compromisesived as an optimal compromise in the sense of minimizing the sum of the distances to the individual utility functions. It is shown that metrics are not suitable as distance functions in this framework. Using a quadratic distance function as an example, the utilitarian social welfare functional is ch