Titlebook: Markets, Games, and Organizations; Essays in Honor of R Tatsuro Ichiishi,Thomas Marschak Book 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003 G

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justify

On characterizing the probability of survival in a large competitive economy,ifies the minimum expenditure necessary for survival at a given price system. If at any equilibrium price system, the income of the agent is no more than the minimum expenditure for survival, it is ruined. The main results characterize the probability of ruin when the number of agents is large. The

BOOR

Uniqueness of Arrow-Debreu and Arrow-Radner equilibrium when utilities are additively separable,ium when agents have additively separable utilities. We then study how, in the specific framework of a two period contingent good economy the results obtained generalize to infinite dimension. We consider economies where agents’ consumption space is ..(μ) 1 ≤ . ≤ ∞ and agents’ utilities are additive

Communicate

門(mén)閂

Incommensurate

荒唐

Vulvodynia

NAIVE

Coordination of economic activity: An example,n; “Which economic activities are (or should be) coordinated by markets, and which by other means?” “Other means” usually refers to administrative or bureaucratic mechanisms; sometimes the word “hierarchies” is used. This paper presents a formal model focused on productive activities, in which this

Asparagus

Transversals, systems of distinct representatives, mechanism design, and matching,e) such that the representative uniquely identifies the set it belongs to. Theorem 1 gives a necessary and sufficient condition that an arbitrary collection, finite or infinite, of sets, finite or infinite, have an SDR. The proof is direct, short. A Corollary to Theorem 1 shows explicitly the applic