Titlebook: Making Brazil Work; Checking the Preside Marcus André Melo,Carlos Pereira Book 2013 Marcus André Melo and Carlos Pereira 2013 budget.compet

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Studies of the Americashttp://image.papertrans.cn/m/image/621622.jpg

殺蟲劑

易受騙

The Politics of Coalition Management,ts employ in this process. What resources do Presidents have at their disposal to maintain coalition discipline? Competing and intriguing answers have come from Brazil, often portrayed as the archetype of minority presidentialism combined with extreme multipartism.

群居動(dòng)物

azil as a case study in multiparty presidentialism, the authors argue that Brazil‘s success stems from the combination of a constitutionally strong president and a robust system of checks and balances.978-1-349-45674-1978-1-137-31084-2

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Checks and Balances, Political Competition, and Public Goods in the Brazilian States,portfolios) are unavailable or incomplete at best, we focus the analysis on exploring empirically how distinct patterns of political competition and checks and balances engender incentives for the state executive (governors) to govern their states efficiently and adroitly.

Alpha-Cells

Strong President, Robust Democracy,acies is that democratic stability (or lack thereof) in Latin American countries has been engendered by the existence of an extended system of checks and balances and rule of law, which are ultimately generated by political competition and power fragmentation.

遵循的規(guī)范

Coalition Governments and Independent Regulatory Agencies in the Brazilian States,bureaucratic delegation: If governors’ power is truly constant across Brazil’s states, we should not see variation in bureaucratic autonomy. In fact, we should have seen resistance to agency autonomy in each and every state, that is, we expect fairly low and constant degrees of delegation of power to regulatory agencies.

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