Titlebook: Local Government Economics; Principles and Pract Stephen J. Bailey Textbook 1999Latest edition Stephen J. Bailey 1999 economics.efficiency.

TOUT

書目名稱Local Government Economics影響因子(影響力)




書目名稱Local Government Economics影響因子(影響力)學科排名




書目名稱Local Government Economics網(wǎng)絡公開度




書目名稱Local Government Economics網(wǎng)絡公開度學科排名




書目名稱Local Government Economics被引頻次




書目名稱Local Government Economics被引頻次學科排名




書目名稱Local Government Economics年度引用




書目名稱Local Government Economics年度引用學科排名




書目名稱Local Government Economics讀者反饋




書目名稱Local Government Economics讀者反饋學科排名

主講人

The Economic Efficiency Case for Decentralized Government, life have been the focus of debate in many developed countries since the early 1950s. The European Charter of Local Self-Government clearly incorporates the principle that local governments should be as small as possible. Formulated by the Council of Europe in 1985, the Charter has since been ratif

古代

血友病

Revealing Preferences via Exit and Voice,e to low-income groups. It concluded that outward migration of high-income groups and inward migration of low-income groups would not only make such programmes ineffective but also create allocative inefficiency. This conclusion was based on the propensity for individuals and households to migrate t

inflate

The Economics of Local Government Expenditure,conomy and they are usually part-financed by central government. Hence, there is a macroeconomic rationale for control of local government expenditure. However, central control would clearly limit local autonomy, as recognized in the above quotation.

擺動

Fiscal Stress,central and local government. The greater the disparity between central and local government expenditure objectives, the greater the potential for central-local conflict. This is especially the case where central government preferences require local authorities to spend less on services than they wi

流出

The Economics of Local Government Charges,ation. This reflects the perceived greater importance of the alternative methods of financing local government and the emphasis, within the economics literature, on fiscal federalism. Charges are often perceived as the financing instrument of last resort. However, within conventional economic analys

engrossed

The Economics of Local Government Taxation,ralization theorem assumed that the resulting service costs are matched by willingness to pay on the part of local voters (see Chapter 2). In principle, this should be the individual service user paying user-charges, unless markets would fail to achieve allocative efficency in the local government j

synovitis

熄滅

The Median Voter Model and Hypothesis,e preferences lie precisely in the middle of the range of preferences of all voters and are therefore decisive. Median voter demand schedules and indifference curves were used, in Chapters 2 and 9 respectively, to demonstrate allocative efficiency and the impact of grants on collective choices. They