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Titlebook: Litigation and Settlement in a Game with Incomplete Information; An Experimental Stud Wolfgang Ryll Book 1996 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidel

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發(fā)表于 2025-3-21 18:19:06 | 只看該作者 |倒序?yàn)g覽 |閱讀模式
書目名稱Litigation and Settlement in a Game with Incomplete Information
副標(biāo)題An Experimental Stud
編輯Wolfgang Ryll
視頻videohttp://file.papertrans.cn/588/587358/587358.mp4
叢書名稱Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
圖書封面Titlebook: Litigation and Settlement in a Game with Incomplete Information; An Experimental Stud Wolfgang Ryll Book 1996 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidel
描述We investigate a two-person game of litigation and settlement with incomplete information on one side. So far, various theoretical attempts have been made to answer the question of why some people choose not to resolve their disputes and instead go to court and incur litigation costs, even if bargaining leaves room for both parties to fare better when avoiding the conflict. We can distinguish between games which focus on strategic elements like games with incomplete information (see, for example, P‘ng (1983), Samuelson (1982) and Schweizer (1989? and decision-theoretic models neglecting strategic elements (see, for example, Landes (1971) and Gould (1973?. The single-person decision theory approach to litigation assumes litigants to have a subjective estimate of the likelihood that the plaintiff will win the action. Differing views on the probability of winning the court case help to explain the fraction of cases that actually go to trial. Among others, P‘ng (1983) points out the shortcomings of the single-person decision theory approach which does not take into account, for example, the different fee systems in England and the U.S. and the differences in information conflicting par
出版日期Book 1996
關(guān)鍵詞Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung; Game Theory; Spieltheorie; economics; equilibrium; experimental econ
版次1
doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61467-5
isbn_softcover978-3-540-61304-6
isbn_ebook978-3-642-61467-5Series ISSN 0075-8442 Series E-ISSN 2196-9957
issn_series 0075-8442
copyrightSpringer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1996
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發(fā)表于 2025-3-21 22:49:39 | 只看該作者
Introduction,ames with incomplete information (see, for example, P’ng (1983), Samuelson (1982) and Schweizer (1989)) and decision-theoretic models neglecting strategic elements (see, for example, Landes (1971) and Gould (1973)).
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Experimental Results,participate in the first play inexperienced subjects. Subjects who participate in the second and third play are called first-level experienced and second-level experienced subjects respectively. In section 2 we look at the changes in behaviour and the causes of changes in behaviour.
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發(fā)表于 2025-3-22 09:02:11 | 只看該作者
Experimental Design and Organisation of the Experiment, already played the game for 15 rounds, whereas third play refers to subjects who have already played the game for 30 rounds. (3) Experiment: A collection of sessions and/or plays designed to evaluate one or more related economic propositions.
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Comparison of the Results of Direction Learning and the Simple Alternative Theory,is that the two theories predict equally well against the alternative hypothesis that the learning direction theory predicts the observed values in period 15 of the three plays better than the simple alternative theory also called naive theory here.
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einem Wechsel von der Kostendeckung hin zu einem leistungsorientierten Vergütungssystem. Krankenh?user stehen damit vor einem umfassenden Wandel ihrer Prozesse und Strukturen, um sich im neuen Krankenhausmarkt zu positionieren. W?hrend die Effekte und die Funktionsweise der DRGs international hinrei
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