Titlebook: Legal Validity and Soft Law; Pauline Westerman,Jaap Hage,Anne Ruth Mackor Book 2018 Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer

pericardium

Marcel M. T. A. BrusDER‘S classic Theorie der Produktion. A grant from the Danish-Norwegian Foundation made it possible for me to spend six months at the Institute of Economics, University of Oslo, where I became acquainted with Professor RAGNAR FRISCH‘S penetrating pioneer works in this field and where the plan of wri

陳腐思想

surrogate

What Is Legal Validity? Lessons from Soft Law,re distinguished. Source validity and binding force (in a special technical sense) are internal legal notions that are used in legal argumentation. On the contrary, efficacy (also in a special technical sense) is an external notion, used in descriptive theories about law such as sociology of law or

獨(dú)行者

Concept and Validity of Law,hat law is, its validity signifies that law belongs to a certain system of meaning (e.g., a social, moral, or legal order). Accordingly, a norm that can properly be called law may or may not have legal, social, or moral validity (first thesis: separation of concept and validity of law). The first fu

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Sources and Validity,y-endowing facts. They give norms their legal quality. A norm is a . norm (and not a moral or social one) if and only if it is traceable to a source. To understand how this works, I introduce the notion of source statements, which allows the Simple Model to eschew the usual questions about law’s ont

誘導(dǎo)

Geyser

Talkative

Hallmark

Validity: The Reputation of Rules,ether a certain rule can be trusted to have the effect it claims to have. This question in itself rests on the background assumption and collective agreement that in general such legal constructs do matter and make a difference. This article investigates the conditions under which such collective ag

沉積物

A Short Note on the Validity of Rules Guiding Informal Markets,es of informal markets around the world. Informal markets, by definition, lie outside formal legal systems and yet display a tenacious stability in their norms. We show that these norms are valid because they are driven by reputation rather than any higher order of law. In doing so, reputation drive