Titlebook: Language and Reality from a Naturalistic Perspective; Themes from Michael Andrea Bianchi Book 2020 Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 Apr

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博識(shí)

含糊其辭

頂點(diǎn)

finite

團(tuán)結(jié)

Language from a Naturalistic Perspective will see how this simple, ‘Moorean’ observation tells us what to say about reference for proper names, two-dimensionalism, and the internalism–externalism debate. Throughout, the discussion will presume that we language users are natural parts of the natural world.

疼死我了

Andrea BianchiProvides a thorough examination of Michael Devitt’s influential perspective on language and reality.Features 17 essays by outstanding scholars on central issues in contemporary philosophy.Includes ext

coagulation

Hamper

Reference and Causal Chainsto what is commonly assumed, Donnellan’s and Kripke’s sketches point in two rather different directions, by appealing to historical or causal facts of different sorts. In this paper, I shall discuss and criticize Devitt’s causal theory, which confuses things, I shall argue, by mixing, so to speak, Donnellan’s and Kripke’s sketches.

Flu表流動(dòng)

Naming and Non-necessitya broader notion, “qua-priority,” of a truth whose epistemic justification is dependent on no experience other than that required to justify belief of the deliverances of pure semantics. It is argued that Kripke’s examples are neither . nor qua-priori.