Titlebook: Korea: The War before Vietnam; Callum A. MacDonald Book 1986 Callum A. MacDonald 1986 bibliography.Korea.Vietnam

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insurrection

Blatant

Across the Paralleltings soared in the polls. The war was popular. There was little opposition when Truman began to implement the rearmament provisions of NSC-68 in July 1950.. If Korea provided the ‘springboard for a US global build-up’, however, it also posed problems of priorities.. The war was important as a symbo

dermatomyositis

Disastereduced the administration. If MacArthur stripped the ambiguity from the UN resolution of 7 October and overrode the limitations in his military directive, he met with little opposition from Washington. As the advance continued with no sign of Chinese reaction, officials began to feel ‘pretty good’ b

Nomadic

A Crisis of Confidencelidate the Western bloc. In his state of the union message, Truman ruled out ‘a(chǎn)ppeasement’ of the USSR and warned that military strength was ‘the only realistic road to peace’. The United States was preparing for ‘full wartime mobilisation, if that should be necessary’.. The first priority remained

Employee

Attritione the presidential elections of 1952. MacArthur was portrayed as a martyr to Truman’s appeasement of Asian communism.. On 11 April Republican leaders announced that the General had been invited to address Congress and called for an enquiry into US policy in the Far East. The tremendous popularity of

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appall

解脫

Deadlock at Panmunjomn public opinion and its possible impact on the conduct of the war had long been a source of concern. In September 1951 Herbert Morrison, the British Foreign Secretary, remarked that it was as necessary to ‘restrain the more impulsive elements in America as it was to avoid provoking the Soviet Union

Painstaking

Eisenhower: Peace with Honouroval of MacArthur. He disliked the truce talks which threatened his country with a new partition and hoped that Republican rhetoric about liberation would be translated into action. According to Rhee, Truman was a leader with ‘cold feet’ who had pursued a ‘cowardly policy’ in Korea. The only real al