Titlebook: Kant, Wittgenstein, and the Performativity of Thought; Aloisia Moser Book 2021 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under excl

exceptional

A Connection Between Thought and Thing .. I make a distinction between the synthesis of judgment made in general logic and in transcendental logic, and I argue that the transcendental apperception does not give us an . connection, in the sense of self-reflexivity, but a performative one, in the sense of a thought being thought. The conc

ARCHE

Judging as Connecting Thought and Thing Kant’s account of transcendental unity as produced through ., a unity performed in thinking but preceding the unity of the a priori categories that are applied in thought. Longuenesse’s . focuses on the B-edition of the Transcendental Deduction to show that the capacity to judge is an activity of s

Insulin

Synthesis and Bringing the Manifold of Intuition into an Imagehe unity of the proposition. A. B. Dickerson’s . parallels the deduction as a problem of making intelligible the unity of complex representations with the problem of the unity of the proposition. For Dickerson representation is an act of synthesis, which presents to us determinations of the mind con

感染

N斯巴達(dá)人

和平主義

空洞

BRUNT

鍵琴

Performativity and the Act of Thinkingtheories. These include Ferdinand de Saussure and his distinction between . and .; Noam Chomsky and his differentiation between competence and performance; and Wilhelm Humboldt and his distinction between form and use of language. Then I present John Austin and his detection of performative utteranc

滔滔不絕地講

Conclusionthods. In short, I do not describe a system that is enacted but the . of thought and language. There is no gap between thought and language that needs to be “bridged.” Performance is not just what we carry out, it is also what we are, in the sense that there is no gap between thinker and world.