Titlebook: Irrigation in the Mediterranean; Technologies, Instit Fran?ois Molle,Carles Sanchis-Ibor,Lloren? Avellà- Book 2019 Springer Nature Switzerl

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Abdelkader Hamdanenowledge which is ‘Gettier-proof’. We noted that Gettier-style cases essentially trade on the anti-luck intuition that if one has knowledge then one has a true belief that could not have easily been wrong. In light of this fact, one natural thought to have is that rather than fixating on avoiding Ge

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Fran?ois Molle,Oumaima Tanouti,Nicolas Fayssenowledge which is ‘Gettier-proof’. We noted that Gettier-style cases essentially trade on the anti-luck intuition that if one has knowledge then one has a true belief that could not have easily been wrong. In light of this fact, one natural thought to have is that rather than fixating on avoiding Ge

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Sébastien Loubier,Thierry Ruf,Patrice Garin. This must be done because epistemology has been pronounced dead, and methodology nonexisting; and because, when acknowledged at all, they are often misplaced. 1. DESCRIPTIVE EPISTEMOLOGY The following problems are typical of classical epistemology: (i) What can we know? (ii) How do we know? (iii)

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Doron Lavee,Eran Feitelson,Hadas Joseph-Ezra. This must be done because epistemology has been pronounced dead, and methodology nonexisting; and because, when acknowledged at all, they are often misplaced. 1. DESCRIPTIVE EPISTEMOLOGY The following problems are typical of classical epistemology: (i) What can we know? (ii) How do we know? (iii)

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Fran?ois Molle,Carles Sanchis-Ibor. This must be done because epistemology has been pronounced dead, and methodology nonexisting; and because, when acknowledged at all, they are often misplaced. 1. DESCRIPTIVE EPISTEMOLOGY The following problems are typical of classical epistemology: (i) What can we know? (ii) How do we know? (iii)

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