Titlebook: Internet and Network Economics; 6th International Wo Amin Saberi Conference proceedings 2010 Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2010 complexity.eco

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Specializations and Generalizations of the Stackelberg Minimum Spanning Tree Gamed into two sets: a set . of . edges (inducing a spanning tree of .) with a fixed non-negative real cost, and a set . of . edges which are instead priced by a .. This is done with the final intent of . a revenue that will be returned for their purchase by a ., whose goal in turn is to select a minimu

landmark

BLUSH

Optimal Pricing in the Presence of Local Network Effectseature of our model is that consumers experience a (positive) .. In particular, each consumer’s usage level depends directly on the usage of her . in the social network structure. Thus, the monopolist’s optimal pricing strategy may involve offering discounts to certain agents, who have a . position

corporate

Local Dynamics in Bargaining Networks via Random-Turn Gamesning network to optimal play in a random-turn game. We analyze this game using techniques from martingale and Markov chain theory. We obtain a tight polynomial bound on the rate of convergence for a nontrivial class of unweighted graphs (the previous known bound was exponential). Additionally, we sh

Chagrin

Selective Call Out and Real Time Biddinging, that is, each time the publisher contacts the exchange, the exchange “calls out” to solicit bids from ad networks. This solicitation introduces a novel aspect, in contrast to existing literature. This suggests developing a joint optimization framework which optimizes over the allocation and wel

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Disk199

Debate

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Neutral-Spine

False-Name-Proofness in Social Networkst that agents may behave strategically. An emerging phenomenon is to run such mechanisms on a social network; for example, Facebook recently allowed its users to vote on its future terms of use. One significant complication for such mechanisms is that it may be possible for a user to participate mul