Titlebook: Institutions, Equilibria and Efficiency; Essays in Honor of B Christian Schultz,Karl Vind Book 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

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1431-8849 ars, which extend the conventional general equilibrium model in important ways: Efficiency and price regulation are studied when markets are incomplete and existence of equilibria in such settings is proven under very general preference assumptions. The model is extended to include geographical loca

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The Organization of Production, Consumption and Learning,mined endogenously in a competitive market, as are the contracts they enter into, and the production and consumption of private commodities. Equilibrium exists and the core coincides with the set of equilibrium states. Examples and Applications illustrate the flexibility and power of the framework.

Functional

The Evolution of Conventions under Incomplete Information,also an extension to incomplete information of Nash’s demand game, or a simple version of the so-called sealed bid double auction. The examples reveal that equilibrium selection by evolutionary learning may well be in favor of Bayesian equilibria where some types of players fail to coordinate, so that the equilibrium outcomes are inefficient.

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On the Definition of Differentiated Products in the Real World,ia exist and are Pareto optimal. Production issues such as the derived demand for intermediate products, continuity of cost functions, and product selection and technology issues such as mass customization, agile manufacturing, and manufacturability are discussed.

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Do the Wealthy Risk More Money? An Experimental Comparison,y, for the larger amounts of money at risk the fraction of the nonwealthy displaying risk attraction actually exceeds that of the wealthy. We also replicate our previous finding that many people display risk attraction for small money amounts, but risk aversion for large ones.

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