Titlebook: Industrial Organization; Practice Exercises w Pak-Sing Choi,Eric Dunaway,Felix Mu?oz-Garcia Textbook 2023Latest edition The Editor(s) (if a

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Monopoly,lified setting with linear demand and constant marginal costs. Exercise 1.2 then extends our analysis to a context where the monopolist faces a convex cost function (i.e., increasing marginal costs) which may occur when, intuitively, producing further units becomes increasingly expensive. Exercises

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Simultaneous Quantity Competition,p. .) or in prices (Chap. .). In this chapter, we assume that every firm chooses independently and simultaneously its output level, yielding an equilibrium output for each firm and an equilibrium aggregate output for the industry. Given this aggregate output, the equilibrium price is determined by t

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Sequential Competition,ses in Chaps. . and .. In this type of industries, one or more firms choose their output level in a first stage (often referred to as the industry “l(fā)eader”) and, observing this output level/s, other firms respond by selecting their output level/s (and thus are known as the industry “followers”).

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Regulating Imperfectly Competitive Markets,olies with different numbers of firms) and examines different policy tools that can induce firms to produce the output level that maximizes the social welfare (we refer to this output level as the “socially optimal output”), such as subsidies and taxes for each unit of output that the firm produces.

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Collusion,rt the collusion of two firms. Extending into a multiple firm context, Exercise 8.2 indicates that it becomes more difficult for firms to collude as the profit gain from cheating increases with the number of firms, so that every firm needs to assign a sufficiently high value on future profits to sus