Titlebook: Hume on Motivation and Virtue; Charles R. Pigden Book 2009 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2009 cognitivism

lymphoma

,Hume and the Debate on ‘Motivating Reasons’, map of available positions leaves no space for his view, as it rejects an assumption shared by all concerned. Finally, I demonstrate how the disputes most central to the debates we began with evaporate once we follow Hume in rejecting this shared assumption, taking this to count in his favour.

戰(zhàn)役

notice

Humean Sources of Normativity, we specify the reasons that morally require us to do X? How does the recognition that we are required to do X bring us to do X? The task is to provide an answer to the quite plausible claim that moral reasons should be normative as well as motivating.

Oligarchy

Hume on Justice,n nature some motive to produce it, distinct from the sense of its morality’ (T, 3.2.1.7/479). He recognises that this makes for a ‘great difficulty’ because, in the case of just actions, it seems that my motive for them . my regard for justice, which is . distinct from my sense of their morality, their justice.

Synchronism

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https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230281158cognitivism; essay; morality

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Hume on Motivation and Virtue978-0-230-28115-8Series ISSN 2947-552X Series E-ISSN 2947-5538

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