Titlebook: Handbook of Insurance; Georges Dionne Book 20132nd edition Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013 Allocation.Corporate insurance.Fr

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Risk Measures and Dependence Modeling,l risks, modeling their possibly complicated interactions and dependencies is challenging from both a theoretical point of view and from practice. Well-known concepts to model risks are presented and their strengths and weaknesses discussed.

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Optimal Insurance Contracts Under Moral Hazard, coverage of losses. What . does the optimal insurance contract take in sharing risk between the insurer and the individual: a deductible or coinsurance of some kind? What are the factors that influence the design of the contract? Posed in the most general way, the problem is identical to the hidden

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The Economics of Liability Insurance,s control; the effects of limited liability on the demand for liability insurance and on the ability of tort liability to provide optimal incentives; the problem of correlated risk in liability insurance markets; issues in liability insurance contract design; and the efficiency of the US tort liabil

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Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets: Predictions and Tests,s. Our focus throughout is on the methodology rather than on the empirical results. We first discuss the main conclusions reached by insurance theory in both a static and a dynamic framework for exclusive as well as nonexclusive insurance. We put particular emphasis on the testable consequences that

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