Titlebook: Handbook of Insurance; Georges Dionne Book 20132nd edition Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013 Allocation.Corporate insurance.Fr

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Richard MacMinn,James Garvenit, die eigenen Ergebnisse qualitativ mit denen von Maier [ 5] und Stenger [ 9] zu vergleichen, zum anderen hat die Angabe von σ./k. den Vorteil, da? beim übergang von Zug- zu Druckbeanspruchung keine unstete ?nderung in den den Spannungszustand kennzeichnenden Zahlenwerten erfolgt.

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Economic Analysis of Insurance Fraud,e effects of adverse selection, in a context where insurers cannot distinguish honest policyholders from potential defrauders, as well as the consequences of credibility constraints on antifraud policies. Finally, we focus attention on the risk of collusion between policyholders and insurance agents or service providers.

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Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets: Predictions and Tests, to a positive correlation of risk and coverage conditional on all public information. We then discuss how one can disentangle moral hazard and adverse selection and the additional tests that can be run using dynamic data.

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The Empirical Measure of Information Problems with Emphasis on Insurance Fraud and Dynamic Data,planation is that adverse selection is related to exogenous characteristics, while asymmetric learning and moral hazard are due to endogenous actions that may change at any point in time. Dynamic data help to identify the three information problems by permitting causality tests.

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Developments in Risk and Insurance Economics: The Past 40 Years,ments and new approaches which flourished since then. The chapter argues that these developments were only possible because steady advances were made in the economics of risk and uncertainty and in financial theory. Insurance economics has grown in importance to become a central theme in modern econ

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Higher-Order Risk Attitudes,rder risk attitudes also play vital roles in examining such decisions. In this chapter, we examine the theory of these higher-order risk attitudes and show how they entail a preference for combining “good” outcomes with “bad” outcomes. We also show their relevance for non-hedging types of risk-manag

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The Economics of Optimal Insurance Design,ages. Under general conditions on the policyholder risk aversion and on transaction costs, the optimal insurance contract contains full insurance of losses above a straight deductible. This is proven without assuming expected utility. The use of expected utility generates additional results, e.g., i

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