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Titlebook: Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory; Tamer Ba?ar,Georges Zaccour Reference work 2018 Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Na

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41#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 16:11:43 | 只看該作者
42#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 19:09:25 | 只看該作者
Im Zeitalter der fossilen Brennstoffe, is how to ensure that each player will abide by her commitment as time goes by. This will occur if each player still finds it individually rational at any intermediate instant of time to continue to implement her cooperative control rather than switch to a noncooperative control. If this condition
43#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 00:12:03 | 只看該作者
44#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 06:21:44 | 只看該作者
45#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 10:22:54 | 只看該作者
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-32617-6al pollution control and more specifically on the game of climate change with one global stock of pollutants. The chapter has two main themes. First, the different noncooperative Nash equilibria (open loop, feedback, linear, nonlinear) are derived. In order to assess efficiency, the steady states ar
46#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 11:40:48 | 只看該作者
,überleben im Stahlharten Geh?use,or constructing dynamic equilibria in such models, we focus on strategic dynamic programming, which has found extensive application for solving macroeconomic models. We first start by presenting some prototypes of dynamic and stochastic games that have arisen in macroeconomics and their main challen
47#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 16:46:57 | 只看該作者
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09699-0xt, we extend to a differential game setting the Hamiltonian systems approach and this formalism to the case of coupled state-constraints. Finally, we extend the theory to the case of discounted rewards.
48#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 22:58:57 | 只看該作者
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-11706-3l games, dynamic Cournot competition and game models of resource extraction. The provided reference list includes not only seminal papers that commenced research in various directions but also exposes recent advances in this field.
49#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-30 00:08:23 | 只看該作者
Infinite Horizon Concave Games with Coupled Constraintsxt, we extend to a differential game setting the Hamiltonian systems approach and this formalism to the case of coupled state-constraints. Finally, we extend the theory to the case of discounted rewards.
50#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-30 06:48:34 | 只看該作者
Nonzero-Sum Stochastic Gamesl games, dynamic Cournot competition and game models of resource extraction. The provided reference list includes not only seminal papers that commenced research in various directions but also exposes recent advances in this field.
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