Titlebook: ;

誤解

書目名稱Game Theory and Applications影響因子(影響力)




書目名稱Game Theory and Applications影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Game Theory and Applications網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度




書目名稱Game Theory and Applications網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Game Theory and Applications被引頻次




書目名稱Game Theory and Applications被引頻次學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Game Theory and Applications年度引用




書目名稱Game Theory and Applications年度引用學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Game Theory and Applications讀者反饋




書目名稱Game Theory and Applications讀者反饋學(xué)科排名

lambaste

accrete

灌溉

Sprechwissenschaft & Psycholinguistik 5 requires backward induction as a different solution method and the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium as a refinement of the solution concept that explicitly considers that a consistent and rational decision is made in each stage of the game (subgame). In this context, it is also discussed how the se

通情達(dá)理

Paula Irik,Irene Maijer-Kruijssenoffs can extend over many periods in the future, it is shown how the present value of a cash flow can be calculated by discounting. Repeated games can have a stationary structure, i.e., the game, including the payoffs and strategy options, remains unchanged, or a non-stationary structure, i.e., the

Respond

Einzelbesprechung der Sprengstoffeon about key aspects or parameters of their opponent (technically, they do not know “their opponent‘s type”), such as the co-player’s strategies or payoffs. As a result, each player must form expectations about the co-player’s behavior, which can also change during the course of the game. The soluti

Respond

synovium

Marten Deinum,Daniel Rubio,Josh Longf companies on markets. The examples cover topics like competition on price (e.g. Bertrand-competition), market share (e.g. Cournot competition and advertising), strategic incentives for investment (e.g. R&D and technical standards), incentive mechanisms for compensation as well as implications of m

牢騷

節(jié)約

Decision Theory of the world, i.e., the scenarios in which events can occur. The information depends on whether the probability of the states is unknown (fundamental uncertainty) or known (risk). The various decision rules are illustrated and critically discussed using an example. Subsequently, the applicability o