Titlebook: Games in Management Science; Essays in Honor of G Pierre-Olivier Pineau,Simon Sigué,Sihem Taboubi Book 2020 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

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A Lanchester-Type Dynamic Game of Advertising and Pricing,gest a generalization of the Lanchester market share dynamics such that the rates at which firms attract market share from each other are determined not only by their advertising efforts but also by the consumer prices charged in the market. A full characterization of Nash equilibrium price and advertising strategies is obtained.

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A Review of Experiments on Dynamic Games in Environmental and Resource Economics,marks. The second group covers contributions that design experiments that aim to find behavioral support for the use of specific types of strategies. Both the first and second groups exclusively use a discrete time framework. Finally, we discuss the exceptions in this literature that study behavior in continuous time.

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A Dynamic Game with Interaction Between Kantian Players and Nashian Players, the tragedy of the commons and ask what would happen if not all agents are solely motivated by self interest. We establish that even without external punishment of violation of social norms, if a sufficiently large fraction of the population consists of Kantian agents, the tragedy of the commons can be substantially mitigated.

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Book 2020hains, energy and environmental management, and cyber defense. With this book, former Ph.D. students and successful research collaborators of Professor Zaccour wish to honor his many scientific achievements..

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0884-8289 r Georges Zaccour.Examines a wide variety of game theory appThis book covers a large spectrum of cutting-edge game theory applications in management science in which Professor Georges Zaccour has made significant contributions. The book consists of 21 chapters and highlights the latest treatments of

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-85574-0gest a generalization of the Lanchester market share dynamics such that the rates at which firms attract market share from each other are determined not only by their advertising efforts but also by the consumer prices charged in the market. A full characterization of Nash equilibrium price and advertising strategies is obtained.

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Abstimmungsmacht in Unternehmen,marks. The second group covers contributions that design experiments that aim to find behavioral support for the use of specific types of strategies. Both the first and second groups exclusively use a discrete time framework. Finally, we discuss the exceptions in this literature that study behavior in continuous time.