Titlebook: Game Theory for Networks; Third International Vikram Krishnamurthy,Qing Zhao,Yonggang Wen Conference proceedings 2012 ICST Institute for C

中古

Establishing Network Reputation via Mechanism Design,a centralized ., who then computes a . for each network. We use a simple mechanism to demonstrate that not only a network has the incentive to provide information about itself (even though it is in general not true), but also that this information can help decrease the estimation error.

匍匐

Game-theoretic Robustness of Many-to-one Networks,uilibrium of the game is equal to the reciprocal of the . of the network. We describe optimal adversarial and operator strategies and give efficient, polynomial-time algorithms to compute optimal strategies. We also generalize our game model to include varying node weights, as well as attacks against nodes.

Frequency-Range

1867-8211 ngs of the Third International Conference on Game Theory for Networks (GameNets 2012) held in Vancouver, Canada, May 24-26, 2012. The 13 revised full papers were carefully selected from 24 submissions and are presented together with 7 invited papers. The papers focus on topics such as mechanism desi

Astigmatism

馬賽克

Blanch

動(dòng)物

Achievability of Efficient Satisfaction Equilibria in Self-Configuring Networks,neral framework. Numerical results are provided in the context of a particular uplink power control scenario, and convergence from any initial action profile to an ESE is formally proved in this scenario. This property ensures the proposed rule to be robust to the dynamic arrival or departure of rad

BOAST

A Competitive Rate Allocation Game,not, and show that it is possible for the transmitter to set penalties so as to ensure that both receivers have a dominant strategy and the corresponding Price of Anarchy is bounded by 2. We show, moreover, that this is in a sense the best possible bound. We next consider the case when receivers hav

Exonerate

A Game Theoretic Optimization of the Multi-channel ALOHA Protocol, we propose to limit each user’s total access probability and solve the problem under a total probability constraint. We characterize the NEPs when user rates are subject to a total transmission probability constraint. We propose a simple best-response algorithm that solves the constrained rate maxi

Confess

Marketing Games in Social Commerce, discussions provide strategic implications and policy directions to overcome the shortcomings intrinsic to the current business model, and help the industry to sustainably develop itself toward the next level.