Titlebook: Game Theory for Cyber Deception; From Theory to Appli Jeffrey Pawlick,Quanyan Zhu Book 2021 Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 Game Theory

encyclopedia

Christine Hartmann,Marcus Hillinger and dependability. Unfortunately, the dynamic and plug-n-play nature of the IoT makes reputation-based trust systems insufficient. Hence, this chapter develops a framework for predictive or strategic trust in which agents make decisions in view of the incentives of the agents with whom they are com

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Detoxification

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Rahmenbedingungen für ein Altern mit Zukunfton that are found more broadly in the existing literature. As a point of reference, we refer to the research works mentioned in Chap.?.. The literature discussed in Chap.?. points towards four major challenges in cyber deception.

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48670-8ess of threats to cyberspace has helped spur private and public investment in cyberdefense. Yet in the past 10 years, cyberthreats have not only continued to exist, but have also developed new forms based on the evolution of new technologies. This book can be seen as an attempt to confront that reality.

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Albert Y. Sun,Grace Y. Sun,Laurie L. Foudin matrix-form strategic games and the concept of Nash equilibrium. We then present extensive-form games and the concept of information sets. Stackelberg games are an important type of extensive-form games. This chapter introduces the structure of the game and the solution concept of Stackelberg equilibrium.

發(fā)牢騷

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Das Ausscheidungssystem: Niere und Blase, a species of crypsis (Sect.?.). But in other species of deception, the defender aims to create a specific false belief. This is called mimesis. The present chapter studies static mimesis, or, ., which takes its name from technologies related to honeypots, honeytokens, etc.

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