找回密碼
 To register

QQ登錄

只需一步,快速開始

掃一掃,訪問微社區(qū)

打印 上一主題 下一主題

Titlebook: Game Theory; An Introduction with Ana Espinola-Arredondo,Felix Mu?oz-Garcia Textbook 2023 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s),

[復(fù)制鏈接]
樓主: CK828
41#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 18:36:25 | 只看該作者
,Nash Equilibria in?Games with?Continuous Action Spaces,ete, action spaces, such as firms choosing how much output to produce, which price to set for their products, or how much to invest in advertising. A similar argument applies to other social sciences, such as the political platform that candidates choose when they run for office, or how much each donor contributes to a charity.
42#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 21:04:17 | 只看該作者
43#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 00:41:47 | 只看該作者
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium,ayers are uninformed about some piece of information, such as auctions where every bidder privately observes her valuation for the object on sale but does not observe the valuation that other bidders assign to the object.
44#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 06:26:37 | 只看該作者
Textbook 2023undergraduate and Masters-level students in economics and finance. Paired with the exercises published on the accompanying website, students will improve both their theoretical and practical understandings of game theory...Readers will walk away from this book understanding complete and incomplete information modelsas well as signaling games..
45#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 07:50:24 | 只看該作者
46#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 14:55:02 | 只看該作者
Jeffrey M. Lehman,Michael S. Blaiss labor-market signaling game, we found th at a PBE where no worker type acquires education can be supported if, upon observing the surprising event of an educated worker, the firm believes she must be of low productivity.
47#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 18:21:03 | 只看該作者
Equilibrium Refinements, labor-market signaling game, we found th at a PBE where no worker type acquires education can be supported if, upon observing the surprising event of an educated worker, the firm believes she must be of low productivity.
48#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 23:05:33 | 只看該作者
to different settings in economics, business, and more.Suppl.An introduction to game theory, complete with step-by-step tools and detailed examples..?..This book offers condensed breakdowns of game-theory concepts. Specifically, this textbook provides “tools” or “recipes” to solve different classes
49#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-30 02:07:26 | 只看該作者
50#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-30 07:12:15 | 只看該作者
 關(guān)于派博傳思  派博傳思旗下網(wǎng)站  友情鏈接
派博傳思介紹 公司地理位置 論文服務(wù)流程 影響因子官網(wǎng) 吾愛論文網(wǎng) 大講堂 北京大學(xué) Oxford Uni. Harvard Uni.
發(fā)展歷史沿革 期刊點(diǎn)評 投稿經(jīng)驗(yàn)總結(jié) SCIENCEGARD IMPACTFACTOR 派博系數(shù) 清華大學(xué) Yale Uni. Stanford Uni.
QQ|Archiver|手機(jī)版|小黑屋| 派博傳思國際 ( 京公網(wǎng)安備110108008328) GMT+8, 2025-10-11 09:11
Copyright © 2001-2015 派博傳思   京公網(wǎng)安備110108008328 版權(quán)所有 All rights reserved
快速回復(fù) 返回頂部 返回列表
克山县| 靖州| 绥宁县| 永仁县| 澄城县| 红桥区| 安平县| 大名县| 三门峡市| 贵南县| 梨树县| 灵丘县| 怀安县| 金乡县| 沂水县| 巴南区| 昌乐县| 礼泉县| 会昌县| 汉阴县| 茌平县| 乌苏市| 林口县| 尤溪县| 临高县| 九龙城区| 尼玛县| 高淳县| 镇安县| 眉山市| 高雄县| 乌苏市| 黎川县| 阜新| 云林县| 滦平县| 离岛区| 阜平县| 循化| 铜山县| 临西县|