Titlebook: Game Equilibrium Models I; Evolution and Game D Reinhard Selten Book 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1991 Spieltheorie.Wirtschaftsth

皺紋

書目名稱Game Equilibrium Models I影響因子(影響力)




書目名稱Game Equilibrium Models I影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Game Equilibrium Models I網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度




書目名稱Game Equilibrium Models I網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Game Equilibrium Models I被引頻次




書目名稱Game Equilibrium Models I被引頻次學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Game Equilibrium Models I年度引用




書目名稱Game Equilibrium Models I年度引用學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Game Equilibrium Models I讀者反饋




書目名稱Game Equilibrium Models I讀者反饋學(xué)科排名

控訴

Pollinator Foraging and Flower Competiton in a Game Equilibrium Model,is not clear why the product should be delivered after payment has been obtained by successful advertising. In fact, many species of orchids heavily invest in advertising without offering any resource to pollinators.

insincerity

utionary game theory, which was introduced in 1973 by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price. In this theory, the dynamical process of natural selection is not modeled explicitly. Instead, the selective forces acting within a population are represented by a fitness function, which is then analysed a

朋黨派系

Book 1991ame theory, which was introduced in 1973 by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price. In this theory, the dynamical process of natural selection is not modeled explicitly. Instead, the selective forces acting within a population are represented by a fitness function, which is then analysed according t

idiopathic

Introduction to Volume I: Evolution and Game Dynamics,Strong assumptions on the rationality of the players seemed to be indispensable at the basis of game theory. Therefore, it came as a surprise that after the pioneering paper of Maynard Smith and Price (1973) more and more biologists began to apply game theory.

agnostic

agnostic

entitle

The Origin of Isogamous Sexual Differentiation,s presume that the differentiation of gametes into mating types started within a primordial population consisting entirely of undifferentiated gametes. However, none of the population genetical models for the evolution of mating types investigated thus far yields a satisfactory explanation for the s

GRAZE

The Evolutionary Stability of Bluffing in a Class of Extensive Form Games, contests where males compete for females, Red deer will settle the contest based on roaring tempo (Clutton-Brock and Albon 1979), toads on the pitch of a males croak (Davies and Halliday 1978) and African buffalo on ritualized head-on charges (Sinclair 1977). The traditional view of communication i

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