| 書目名稱 | Fairness in Bargaining and Markets |
| 編輯 | Christian Korth |
| 視頻video | http://file.papertrans.cn/341/340590/340590.mp4 |
| 概述 | Includes supplementary material: |
| 叢書名稱 | Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems |
| 圖書封面 |  |
| 描述 | This book focuses on economic bargaining theory. Economic bargaining theory seeks to predict the outcomes of bargaining situations. In such situations, govern ments, ?rms, or individuals share a mutual interest in cooperation; however, they also have con?icting interests regarding the terms of an agreement. A classic ex ample of such a situation is wage bargaining between unions and employers. More commonplace examples also exist. For instance, a discussion between partners on how to spend an evening can be understood as a bargaining situation. Economic bargaining theory explores the relationship between bargaining situ ations and the outcomes of the bargaining. Economists have two primary reasons to show interest in this relationship. The ?rst reason is that many important human interactions, including economic interactions, are bargaining situations. The second reason is that the understanding of these situations may inform the economic theory of markets. The tool utilized in this study is the mathematical theory of games. Predictions for bargaining outcomes are developed by modeling the bargaining situation as a strategic game and using game theoretic equilibrium concepts in ord |
| 出版日期 | Book 2009 |
| 關鍵詞 | Behavioral Economics; Evolutionary Stability; Random Matching; Reciprocity; Reference Dependence; Social |
| 版次 | 1 |
| doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02253-1 |
| isbn_softcover | 978-3-642-02252-4 |
| isbn_ebook | 978-3-642-02253-1Series ISSN 0075-8442 Series E-ISSN 2196-9957 |
| issn_series | 0075-8442 |
| copyright | Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009 |
|Archiver|手機版|小黑屋|
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