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Titlebook: Expectations and Stability in Oligopoly Models; Koji Okuguchi Book 1976 Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg 1976 Stability.calculus.functi

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21#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-25 03:21:53 | 只看該作者
22#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-25 11:22:54 | 只看該作者
Adaptive Expectations and Stability of Oligopoly Equilibrium,aptive expectations on all others’ outputs. The market demand function, and the cost and profit functions of the i-th firm are given, respectively, by .No sign restriction is imposed on parameter d. of the cost function. If d. is negative, however, marginal as well as total costs might become negati
23#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-25 12:32:40 | 只看該作者
Unknown Demand Function and Stability, information of market demand function for its product as well as for the market price and rivals’ outputs in the past. In this chapter we drop this assumption of complete in formation. Thus although each firm does not in general have exact knowledge of the true market demand function, it is assumed
24#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-25 17:35:28 | 只看該作者
Probability Models, function will perceive them subjectively. Oligopolists in Chapter 8 were assumed to perceive subjectively only the unknown market demand function. Notwithstanding their perceptions of the unknown marginal cost and/or market demand function, firms in both chapters were given no allowance for probabi
25#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-25 22:37:01 | 只看該作者
Reinhold Sellien,Helmut Sellienr close substitutes are limited in number. The fewness of firms in oligopoly gives rise to interdependence which they have to take into account in choosing their optimal output or pricing policies in each production period. Since each firm’s profit is a function of all firms’ outputs in an oligopoly
26#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 00:56:49 | 只看該作者
27#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 05:09:15 | 只看該作者
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59558-0due to Mayberry, Nash and Shubik(1953)(see also Shubik (1959)), let two firms’ cost functions in a Cournot duopoly under no product differentiation be given by . and let . be the market demand function. If two firms act in perfect competition, marginal costs of both must equal the competitively give
28#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 09:41:20 | 只看該作者
29#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 16:25:06 | 只看該作者
Gaelic Games and Player Violence,von Stackelberg(1934) has almost been outside the scope of concern of economists. J.M.Henderson and R.E.Quandt(1958) in now a classic on mathematical microeconomics have given an excellent summary of Stackelberg’s fundamental idea on duopoly without, however, giving any systematic analysis of dynami
30#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 20:11:26 | 只看該作者
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-2190-6aptive expectations on all others’ outputs. The market demand function, and the cost and profit functions of the i-th firm are given, respectively, by .No sign restriction is imposed on parameter d. of the cost function. If d. is negative, however, marginal as well as total costs might become negati
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