Titlebook: Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models; Essays by and in Hon Mostapha Diss,Vincent Merlin Book 2021 Springer Nature Switzerland

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slow-wave-sleep

Moral Development and Citizenship Educationuently occurs under various distributional assumptions about the voters’ preferences. The extent to which it is real threat, however, strongly depends on the voting rule, the underlying distribution of preferences, and, somewhat surprisingly, the parity of the number of voters.

connoisseur

sleep-spindles

The Effect of Closeness on the Election of?a Pairwise Majority Rule Winneriven that such a candidate exists. Our results, based on the Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) assumption, show that closeness has also a significant effect on the Condorcet efficiency of some voting rules in the class of Scoring Rules and Scoring Elimination Rules.

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Analyzing the Practical Relevance of the Condorcet Loser Paradox and the Agenda Contraction Paradoxuently occurs under various distributional assumptions about the voters’ preferences. The extent to which it is real threat, however, strongly depends on the voting rule, the underlying distribution of preferences, and, somewhat surprisingly, the parity of the number of voters.

Narcissist

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Introduction,0s saw the development of new mathematical tools and techniques to analyze voting rules and decision-making. It is needless to say that some of these arguments are based on the notion of probabilities.?The next paragraphs will present several contributions that are worth mentioning.?

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Majority Efficient Representation of the Citizens in a Federal Unionobability of electing the candidate who receives less than 50% of the votes in a two candidate competition over the whole union. Depending on the assumptions that we use to describe the electoral process, either the proportional or the square root rule can emerge as an optimal solution.

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forager

Dummy Players and the Quota in?Weighted Voting Games: Some Further Resultser number of players (up?to 15). It is shown that the probability of having a player without voting power is very sensitive to the choice of the quota and the quota values that minimize this probability are derived.