Titlebook: European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2017; Marc Bungenberg,Markus Krajewski,Andreas R. Ziegle Book 2017 Springer Nature Switzer

incoherent

書目名稱European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2017影響因子(影響力)




書目名稱European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2017影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名




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書目名稱European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2017網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名




書目名稱European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2017被引頻次




書目名稱European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2017被引頻次學(xué)科排名




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書目名稱European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2017年度引用學(xué)科排名




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書目名稱European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2017讀者反饋學(xué)科排名

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European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2017

憤慨一下

分貝

Paradox

Sincere Cooperation in the Common Commercial Policy: Lisbon, a “Joined-Up” Union, and “Brexit”es seriously constrain their leeway for autonomous action. In addition, the article applies this finding to a number of current developments surrounding the CCP. These include, firstly, the new Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy, which promotes the idea of a “joined-up” approach between

打谷工具

Article 21 TEU and the EU’s Common Commercial Policy: A Test of Coherenceh as to what extent Article 21 TEU constrains the foreign policy of the EU and its effect with specific reference to the CCP. Further, the article will consider the relationship between Article 21 TEU and other programmatic articles of the TEU, such as Article 3 TEU, and the incorporation of non-com

打谷工具

貪婪性

The EU’s Trade Defence Instruments: Recent Judicial and Policy Developmentst the calculation of the normal value in anti-dumping investigations against imports from China, see in detail Annex S of the Staff Working Document, SWD(2016) 330 final, that is published together with the Commission’s Annual Report on the EU’s Anti-Dumping, Anti-Subsidy and Safeguard Activities. T

一小塊

Evacuate

The EU and Investor-State Dispute Settlement: WTO Litigators Going “Investor-State Arbitration” and g public criticism of this form of investor-State dispute settlement, however, various attempts have been made to correct the perceived deficiencies of investor-State arbitration. In addition to fine-tuning and limiting the scope of the substantive investment protection standards in the new EU treat