Titlebook: European Yearbook of Constitutional Law 2019; Judicial Power: Safe Ernst Hirsch Ballin,Gerhard van der Schyff,Maarten Book 2020 T.M.C. Asse

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書目名稱European Yearbook of Constitutional Law 2019影響因子(影響力)




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書目名稱European Yearbook of Constitutional Law 2019讀者反饋學(xué)科排名

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