Titlebook: Environmental Economics and the International Economy; Laura Marsiliani,Michael Rauscher,Cees Withagen Book 2002 Springer Science+Business

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Regulatory Competition, Transboundary Pollution and International Trade,ated monopoly that emits pollution to reduce its cost of production. We study the impact of opening borders and of delegating environmental policies at a supra-national level. Under complete information, opening borders leads to a reallocation of the production from the large country (with a high ma

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Modelling Commitment in Multi-Stage Models of Location, Trade and Environment,s and that these incentives are particularly strong in industries where plants are footloose. In an earlier paper we used a simple model of imperfect competition to compare the environmental policies (in this case, emission standards) that would be set by non-cooperative governments for two differen

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,The Stringency of Environmental Regulation and the ‘Porter Hypothesis’,odds with the assumption of stringent environmental regulation of both proponents and opponents of the ‘Porter Hypothesis’. A possible explanation may be provided by examining the negotiation of environmental regulation in a ‘political market’. In this market, stakeholder attempt to ensure their pre

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Should Emissions Reduction Units be Tradable?,hould ERUs be tradable in the international permit market or usable only to project partners? This important Kyoto detail has received little attention, although the trading rule is a key determinant of incentives to carry out abatement projects. We show that because generating ERUs on a project-by-