Titlebook: Empirical Reason and Sensory Experience; Milo? Vuleti?,Ori Beck Book 2024 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive

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Anhydrous

Empiricism Reformedntion in a commentary such as this. However, I will confine myself to a line of discussion on Gupta’s embrace of realism and rejection of pluralism in philosophy of science. The project of . is to reform empiricism in such a way as to firmly establish “experience as the supreme epistemic authority”,

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SNEER

The Knowledge View of Perception: Capacities, Opportunities and Hindrances for Perceptual Knowledgeovides the perceiver with less than knowledge of how things are renders unintelligble the idea of a capacity for knowledge that, at the same time, it presupposes. Evidently, this is not to deny that your capacity for perception can be actualized without you knowing how things are. But it is to deny

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bisphosphonate

Comments on ‘The Knowledge View of Perception’, by Andrea Kernedge, according to which “perceptual knowledge … is a compound of several capacities, one of which is perception [that somehow falls short of knowledge], and another of which is judgment [that is required to move from perception to knowledge]” (p. 99). I argue that her case against the first represe

acolyte

On Andrea Kern’s “The Knowledge View of Perception”actualized. I argue that this view requires further justification. First, Kern is unable to support her claim that an awareness of our self-conscious capacity for perceptual knowledge is “contained” in all our perceptions. Second, Kern’s claim that perception includes the idea of the conditions of p

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Comment on A. Kern, “The Knowledge View of Perception” will ultimately oppose, between perception, on one hand, and the capacity for knowledge itself, on the other. Kern argues that on this account, perception cannot explain the transition constituted by the act of judgment. But I wonder whether there’s a coherent position on which although (i) the pro