Titlebook: Elites, Institutions and the Quality of Government; Carl Dahlstr?m (Professor),Lena W?ngnerud (Profess Book 2015 The Editor(s) (if applica

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-91833-8rn (Isham et al., 1997) and perform better in areas such as rule of law, bureaucratic quality and school enrolment, as well as provide minimal levels of corruption (Keefer, 2007). These dividends of democracy probably help us understand why it is also claimed that “democracy does cause growth” (Acemoglu et al., 2014, p. 1).

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-10750-7 to do so they establish extractive institutions instead of inclusive ones that would be serving the society at large (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Inclusive institutions are more likely to be observed in democracies, and this suggests a positive correlation between institutional and democratic quality.

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Frank Engelmann,Thomas Guthmannividuals isolate themselves from knowledge of corruption and avoid personal involvement in illicit dealings so long as their from’s bottom line benefits from the malfeasance of their employees and agents? Finally, are there situations where the ‘fish rots from the tail up’? In other words, can perva

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-91853-6s Acemoglu and Robinson (A&R) (2012) offer broad accounts of how this might happen. I argue that these accounts are lacking as they do not adjust for the fact that elites are pursuing an interest defined in terms of power rather than wealth, and that shifting focus from wealth to power would add to

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