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Titlebook: Efficient Rent-Seeking; Chronicle of an Inte Alan A. Lockard,Gordon Tullock Book 2001 Springer Science+Business Media New York 2001 economi

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發(fā)表于 2025-3-21 17:03:28 | 只看該作者 |倒序?yàn)g覽 |閱讀模式
書目名稱Efficient Rent-Seeking
副標(biāo)題Chronicle of an Inte
編輯Alan A. Lockard,Gordon Tullock
視頻videohttp://file.papertrans.cn/304/303001/303001.mp4
圖書封面Titlebook: Efficient Rent-Seeking; Chronicle of an Inte Alan A. Lockard,Gordon Tullock Book 2001 Springer Science+Business Media New York 2001 economi
描述Some time ago one of the editors (Gordon Tullock) stumbled on aparadox in the competition for rents. He asked a previous researchassistant (William Hunter) to work out some examples and gave aseminar on it. For reasons he cannot recall (but probably bad) hetitled his talk `Efficient Rent Seeking‘. As Editor of Public Choicehe was able to publish without a referee. Incidentally, The Journal ofPolitical Economy had turned it down on the grounds that the economycould not be that chaotic, and hence there must be something wrongeven if the referee couldn‘t put his finger on it. .There followed a long series of articles, mainly in Public Choice, inwhich various distinguished scholars proposed solutions to theparadox. The editor responded by finding fault with these solutions.In this case the editor was arguing against interest. He, like thereferee for the JPE, believed that the market works, if not perfectly,at least very well. Nevertheless, the paradox resisted and persisted.It was like the paradox of the liar, and indeed in some cases did showexactly that paradox..Eventually everyone, including the editor, grew tired of the matterand the discussion sort of wound down, although it could
出版日期Book 2001
關(guān)鍵詞economics; equilibrium; modeling; public choice; strategy
版次1
doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-5055-3
isbn_softcover978-1-4419-4866-3
isbn_ebook978-1-4757-5055-3
copyrightSpringer Science+Business Media New York 2001
The information of publication is updating

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沙發(fā)
發(fā)表于 2025-3-21 21:37:04 | 只看該作者
Long-run equilibrium and total expenditures in rent-seeking: A comment, here Table 1 from my ‘Efficient Rent-Seeking.’. This shows the equilibrium investment of each individual, different numbers of individuals playing the game (.), and differing values of .. Table 2, also reproduced (ibid.), shows the total investment.
板凳
發(fā)表于 2025-3-22 01:07:07 | 只看該作者
地板
發(fā)表于 2025-3-22 05:12:02 | 只看該作者
Free entry and efficient rent seeking,itures made to capture an artificially created transfer represent a social waste suggested that the cost to the economy of monopoly and regulation is greater than the simple Harberger (1954) deadweight loss. Indeed, under Tullock’s original formulation and in the extensions of his work by Krueger (1
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發(fā)表于 2025-3-23 01:59:40 | 只看該作者
Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success,election campaigns, industrial disputes, lawsuits, and sibling rivalries. In the rent-seeking literature, each party’s success p. (which can be interpreted either as the probability of victory or as the proportion of the prize won) has usually been taken to be a function of the . of the respective r
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