Titlebook: Economics of Agricultural Crop Insurance: Theory and Evidence; Darrell L. Hueth,William H. Furtan Book 1994 Springer Science+Business Medi

憤怒事實(shí)

The Optimal Design of Crop Insuranceant a source of risk as price uncertainty. Public policies aimed at compensating for yield uncertainty have been less widespread, and, at least at first sight, less successful, than policies aimed at stabilizing prices.

憤怒歷史

Agricultural Insurance, Production and the Environmentmbinations of short-run revenue risk and land price risk. In addition, the paper illustrates the prospective role and importance of land price risk in the determination of insurance program impacts, while distinguishing between effects of “pure” stabilizing insurance and the “truncating” types of insurance that are observed in practice.

DENT

Obligatory

Crop Insurance and Crop Production: An Empirical Study of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selectionproblems have been proposed (for example, Ahsan, Ali, and Kurian 1982, Quiggin 1986, Nelson and Loehman 1987, and Chambers 1989). However, there has been comparatively little empirical study of the problem. One reason may be that it is difficult, in practice, to distinguish between adverse selection and moral hazard.

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