Titlebook: Economic and Environmental Risk and Uncertainty; New Models and Metho Robert Nau,Erik Gr?nn,Olvar Bergland Book 1997 Springer Science+Busin

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4039-8261-2s created by framing effects, a separate study was conducted. 200 students were given a case describing city planning options in a small Norwegian city. They formed panels of maximum three persons each. They were expected to act as concerned citizens and try and build consistent multi criteria utili

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4039-7382-5ventional decision tree diagrams are not well suited to represent such continuously distributed temporal uncertainties. As a modeling aid for such problems, Hazen (1992) introduced the ., a diagram which combines features of decision trees and stochastic-process transition diagrams. Stochastic tree

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https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230306790identical transformation of all values of the bidders into bids. (In a common value auction the problem of allocative efficiency disappears.) The pricing rule has to be an additively separable function of the bids.Under the condition that a pricing rule is efficient, monotone, and reciprocitive (a b

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Beyond the New Economic Anthropologying is not constant even if the flexibility of preference is constant. The main result of this model is that more frequent demand fluctuations are brought about by increase in wealth or income. Our model uses the stochastic dynamic programming method combined with expected utility theory. It is also

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25545-0Emission permit markets are often thin. The conditions for emission permit markets to yield efficient outcomes are therefore not automatically satisfied. This paper shows — using a principal-agent framework — how the regulatory agency (the principal) can induce price-taking behavior by the firms (the agents) in emission permit markets.