Titlebook: Economic Analysis of Information and Contracts; Essays in Honor of J Gerald A. Feltham,Amin H. Amershi,William T. Ziemb Book 1988 Kluwer Ac

Immunization

極小

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0537-5own welfare rather than the value of the firm and they price the firm’s securities accordingly. In order to raise sufficient capital in the securities market, the manager voluntarily bonds himself to the shareholders’ interests.

Microaneurysm

寬大

Martin Wiesmann,Omid Nikoubashmanimited. With only weak restrictions on individuals’ preferences/beliefs, firms’ opportunities, characterization of information, and markets, the analysis here provides a comprehensive treatment of public information’s welfare role in neoclassical production and exchange economies.

Capture

Congeal

The Social Value of Public Information in Production Economiesimited. With only weak restrictions on individuals’ preferences/beliefs, firms’ opportunities, characterization of information, and markets, the analysis here provides a comprehensive treatment of public information’s welfare role in neoclassical production and exchange economies.

憤慨一下

Intrafirm Resource Allocation and Discretionary Actionsselect these same quantities. Consequently, while traditional transfer pricing models identify the implicit prices of intrafirm transfers (which may have some intrinsic interest), these transfer prices need serve no allocational role, and so the failure to implement a transfer pricing scheme has no impact on firm profits in such models.

phytochemicals

教唆

blight

John E. Butterworth’s Pioneering Contributions to the Accounting and Information Economics Literaturction. Material contributions to agency theory in the accounting setting are discussed in the fifth and sixth parts and are followed by comments on John’s research in the areas of oil and gas accounting, and accounting standards and regulations in Canada. Concluding remarks are offered in the last section of this paper.