Titlebook: EU Regulatory Decision Making and the Role of the United States; Transatlantic Regula Oliver Ziegler Book 2013 Springer Fachmedien Wiesbade

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Introduction and research problem,ean Union (EU). The broader realm of the study is the field of transatlantic regulatory cooperation on environmental and consumer issues. In the last decade, scholars in the field of International Political Economy (IPE) have often argued that U.S. dominance in the world economy, fueled by a powerfu

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A theoretical framework,egulation between 1995 and 2003. The U.S. has been defined the ., putting the EU under pressure not to erect trade barriers by unilaterally introducing new regulations. The EU is considered the . being pressured by the foreign government to reject its planned regulatory activities.

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The institutional structure of transatlantic regulatory cooperation,most prominent studies were done by Mark Pollack (2005; 2003b), Mark Pollack and Gregory Shaffer (2009; 2001a; 2001b), Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (2003), and Bart Kerremans (1999). In 2005 Rebeccas Steffenson published her dissertation on “Managing EU-U.S. relations. Actors, institutions and the new tr

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Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment,city. It ranges from large household appliances such as refrigerators and air conditioners, computers and stereo systems, to hand-held digital apparatuses and mobile phones. This equipment often includes hazardous substances, such as lead, mercury, hexavalent chromium, cadmium, and halogenated flame

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Metric Labeling, as environmental issues. In contrast to our previous case studies, however, this case is an apt example of how U.S. pressure and a united industry front made prevention- focused regulatory cooperation a success and made U.S. economic interests prevail in the EU’s regulatory decision making process.

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The four cases and their outcomes,lanned European directive. The remaining three cases have illustrated how the EU unilaterally adopted new regulations while showing little consideration for U.S. economic interests or regulatory cooperation respectively. This is a most surprising result as critical voices in IPE would have predicted

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Generalizing the conclusions to other cases,phasized, “if […] researchers seek to make causal inferences, they should, in principle, be concerned about the larger comparison.” As such, we should assess whether the conclusions of this study can help gain insights into the general process of prevention-focused regulatory cooperation. In order t

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-00054-7EU decision making; EU-U; S; regulatory cooperation