Titlebook: E-Voting and Identity; Second International Peter Y. A. Ryan,Berry Schoenmakers Conference proceedings 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelbe

使出神

https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0017912rithm is exploited not only to count the votes without revealing them but also to adjust the votes when a new round of counting is needed. Moreover, it achieves all the security properties usually desired in e-voting.

脫水

LOPE

J. L. Kardos,M. P. Dudukovi?,R. Dave introduce concepts for discussing its implications for e-voting beyond the Netherlands. We introduce the term . to denote any physical, digital or social evidence of a voter’s choices in an election. From this perspective, we provide a framework for risk classification as well as an overview of countermeasures against such traces.

manifestation

SPECT

灰姑娘

挫敗

978-3-642-04134-1Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

模范

https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0047943an dictate to a voter, either through duress or by offering payment, that increase the probability of a compliant voter constructing a vote for the adversary’s preferred candidate. Using a representative E2E system, we place the attacks in game-theoretic terms and study the effectiveness of three pr

準則

https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0008753ce Masked Ballot, an online voting scheme that mitigates these attacks while using a more practical assumption: untappable channels are available but only . the election. During the election voters cast ballots over completely public channels without relying on untappable channels, anonymous channel

Inclement