Titlebook: Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues; Daniel Gregory,Kourken Michaelian Book 2024 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), un

COKE

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49514-9, that we can actually make judgments during dreams and not just imagine doing so; that we retain a fairly high degree of rationality during dreams; and that there is a respectable sense in which we can refer to . at all when we dream.

Canopy

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-230-21248-0ling to meet the conditions required for occupying a such perspective. In such circumstances, one fails to occupy a conscious perspective that makes possible even the minimal orienting knowledge ‘I am here now’.

競(jìng)選運(yùn)動(dòng)

inating feels like seeing than that seeing feels like hallucinating, and much more inclined to agree that dreaming feels like seeing than the other way around. Furthermore, beliefs about phenomenological similarity were associated with beliefs about how likely various metacognitive mistakes are.

商品

ly on memory. The resultant view of sensory imagination provides a counterexample to Hume’s account of sensory imagination, according to which sensory imagination must be built up from faint copies of sensory impressions stored in memory.

GLIB

偽造

Radiation

Studying Dream Experience Through Dream Reports: Points of Contact Between Dream Research and First- of dreaming could profit from the application of elements of first-person methods in consciousness research. We consider two specific interview methods: descriptive research sampling and micro-phenomenological interviews, discuss their applicability in dream research, and outline promising directions for future research.

鋼盔

Is It Possible to Have Episodic Memories During Non-lucid Dreams?, that we can actually make judgments during dreams and not just imagine doing so; that we retain a fairly high degree of rationality during dreams; and that there is a respectable sense in which we can refer to . at all when we dream.

ANIM

遠(yuǎn)足