Titlebook: Dynamic Games in Economics; Josef Haunschmied,Vladimir M. Veliov,Stefan Wrzacz Book 2014 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014 Conflict S

Inclement

Capacity Accumulation Games with Technology Constraints,To assess the factors that influence efficiency and market power, the chapter presents a linear-quadratic example. Our simulations indicate that contracts based on input quantities generate higher joint payoffs and tend to benefit the input producer.

擁護(hù)

Time-Consistent Equilibria in a Differential Game Model with Time Inconsistent Preferences and Parte the sustainability of cooperation, players should bargain at every instant of time their weight in the whole coalition, and nonconstant weights are introduced. The results are illustrated with two examples: a common property resource game and a linear state pollution differential game.

外形

Subgame Consistent Cooperative Provision of Public Goods Under Accumulation and Payoff Uncertaintie procedure” leading to subgame-consistent solutions is derived and an illustration is presented. This is the first time that subgame consistent cooperative provision of public goods with uncertainties in stock dynamics and future payoffs is analyzed.

Pert敏捷

1566-0419 tions for future research in the field.Includes supplementar.Dynamic game theory serves the purpose of including strategic interaction in decision making and is therefore often applied to economic problems. This book presents the state-of-the-art and directions for future research in dynamic game th

output

袖章

Chemische und tribologische Eigenschaftenlution control and the lake game. It will be shown that existing solution techniques can cover some of the gap between non-cooperative Nash equilibria and the cooperative outcome. It will also be shown that the regulation by means of realistic tax rates can cover some of the remaining gap but not all the way.

conception

拋物線(xiàn)

Karen D?ring,Anja S. G?ritz,Klaus Moserfeedback information pattern, and the Stackelberg game for the feedback information pattern. Applying the OPTGAME algorithm to the MUMOD1 model we show how the policy makers react to demand and supply shocks according to different solution concepts. Some comments are given on possible applications to the recent sovereign debt crisis in Europe.

Vaginismus

Mortal

Karen D?ring,Anja S. G?ritz,Klaus Moseralysis of this game is used to obtain through an indirect approach SPE for three classes of differential/dynamic games: (i) linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) zero-sum differential games with common noisy measurements, (ii) discrete-time LQG zero-sum dynamic games with common noisy measurements, and (i