Titlebook: Differential Information Economies; Dionysius Glycopantis,Nicholas C. Yannelis Book 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005 Differenti

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On the continuity of expected utilityess of the domain of the expected utility. Our results have useful applications in cooperative solution concepts in economies and games with differential information, in noncooperative games with differential information and in principal-agent problems.

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Market games with differential information and infinite dimensional commodity spaces: the coreodity spaces. We also identify a critical feature of information sharing rules that ensures nonemptiness of the core. In essence, the only condition we require on the sharing rules is that profitable “insider trading” be prohibited. In the absence of insider trading, balancedness is guaranteed and core nonemptiness follows.

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Insatiable

Risk aversion and incentive compatibility with , information asymmetryisk aversion of the borrower. The optimality of ., which Diamond obtained for the case of risk neutrality, is shown to be nonrobust to the introduction of risk aversion. This contrasts with the costly state verification literature, in which debt contracts are optimal for risk averse as well as risk neutral borrowers.

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Carla Brisotto,Fabiano Lemes de Oliveiraodity spaces. We also identify a critical feature of information sharing rules that ensures nonemptiness of the core. In essence, the only condition we require on the sharing rules is that profitable “insider trading” be prohibited. In the absence of insider trading, balancedness is guaranteed and c