Titlebook: Deterring Cyber Warfare; Bolstering Strategic Brian M. Mazanec,Bradley A. Thayer Book 2015 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publ

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書目名稱Deterring Cyber Warfare影響因子(影響力)




書目名稱Deterring Cyber Warfare影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Deterring Cyber Warfare網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度




書目名稱Deterring Cyber Warfare網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Deterring Cyber Warfare被引頻次




書目名稱Deterring Cyber Warfare被引頻次學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Deterring Cyber Warfare年度引用




書目名稱Deterring Cyber Warfare年度引用學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Deterring Cyber Warfare讀者反饋




書目名稱Deterring Cyber Warfare讀者反饋學(xué)科排名

使堅硬

Basil A. Allsopp,Jere W. McBride, and Computer Network Attack (CNA). It also introduces a variety of characteristics that are unique or particularly pronounced when it comes to cyber weapons, as well as discussing some recent attacks.

superfluous

Malleable

Genome Mapping and Genomics in Arthropodsrom deterrence theory for cyber warfare, there are also major problems introduced by the unique aspect of cyber technology that causes significant problems for deterrence. These are, first, uncertainty associated with awareness and attribution of an attack; and second, the uncertain effects of such an attack.

accordance

Deterrence Theory and the Challenge of Applying It to Cyber Warfarerom deterrence theory for cyber warfare, there are also major problems introduced by the unique aspect of cyber technology that causes significant problems for deterrence. These are, first, uncertainty associated with awareness and attribution of an attack; and second, the uncertain effects of such an attack.

改變

Continuing Efforts to Improve Cyber Forensics and Bolster Defensesies for other types of unconventional instruments of war — nuclear and biological weapons. We also recommend continuing efforts to invest in deterrence by denial through robust cyber defenses, which reduce the benefit of hostile adversary action by mitigating the effectiveness of its cyber attacks.

改變

Conclusionswer evidentiary standards for attributing cyber attacks and addressing harboring ‘independent’ attackers; and finally, developing and communicating a clear declaratory policy and credible options for deterrence-in-kind so as to make escalation unavoidable and costly.

MAZE

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