Titlebook: Democratic Counterinsurgents; How Democracies Can William Patterson Book 2016 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclu

STRI

書目名稱Democratic Counterinsurgents影響因子(影響力)




書目名稱Democratic Counterinsurgents影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Democratic Counterinsurgents網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度




書目名稱Democratic Counterinsurgents網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Democratic Counterinsurgents被引頻次




書目名稱Democratic Counterinsurgents被引頻次學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Democratic Counterinsurgents年度引用




書目名稱Democratic Counterinsurgents年度引用學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Democratic Counterinsurgents讀者反饋




書目名稱Democratic Counterinsurgents讀者反饋學(xué)科排名

發(fā)出眩目光芒

978-1-349-95612-8The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Limited

Pepsin

取回

偏離

indemnify

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-38053-6d practitioners that has developed in the wake of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. It offers a plausible framework for democracies to succeed in future counterinsurgency conflicts. The strategy outlined here will assume a certain type of insurgency—one in a foreign country in which the host go

indemnify

chuckle

Welche Grundlage ist die beste?, military power on the planet was defeated by a small, undeveloped country. Blaming counterinsurgency strategy has been a popular means by which analysts have sought to remove responsibility for failure from the Army itself. As this chapter endeavors to show, nothing could be further from the truth.

壓倒性勝利

Hypothesen und theoretische Perspektiven,especially in a foreign land. If viewed through the wrong lens, it may appear to strengthen the (incorrect) lesson of Vietnam that such efforts are futile. Once again, the most powerful state in the world was prevented from reaching its war aims by a militarily weaker insurgent force in a developing

窗簾等

Mitbestimmung im ?ffentlichen Dienst shows that in Malaya it did work and that in Vietnam and Iraq it wasn’t tried until too late in the day. The theoretical literature which argues that democracies are uniquely incapable of successfully conducting counterinsurgency has also been shown to be unpersuasive. This concluding chapter recap