Titlebook: Decisions, Games and Markets; Pierpaolo Battigalli,Aldo Montesano,Fausto Panunzi Book 1997 Springer Science+Business Media New York 1997 d

監(jiān)禁

Mri485

https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137361912“flexible”, which allows them to vary the cost structure, or a “rigid” technology, which in periods of high demand is more efficient. We build an evolutionary model in which firms tend to imitate the more rewarding technology choice. We characterize stable distributions of technology choices, showin

竊喜

“Direct” and “Indirect” Duality for Dominance Relationsher (vector) space .. Dual characterizations of the dominance relation are of two kinds: “direct,” which are based on the dominance ordering on ., and “indirect,” which are derived from the partial ordering on .. Indirect representations are easier to obtain but less prone to meaningful interpretati

Evacuate

verdict

Games with Observable Deviators that of her . — 1 opponents. This paper defines and characterizes the observable deviators property for extensive form games with incomplete information and illustrates how this property can be used to simplify game theoretic analysis. In particular, it is proved that sequential equilibria can be c

absorbed

Conjectural Equilibria and Rationalizability in a Game with Incomplete Informationmption is dropped. We provide a macroeconomic example which clearly illustrates the crucial role of players’ structural and behavioral conjectures: different equilibrium and disequilibrium paths (some with keynesian type inefficiencies) are generated by different expectations patterns. Convergence o

Toxoid-Vaccines

Lexicographic Rationality Orderings and Iterative Weak Dominanceic system put forward by Blume . (1991a), i.e. each player is endowed with a vector of probability measures on her opponents’ strategy space and act to lexicographically maximize her expected utility. The theory of rationality orderings entails that players’ strategy sets are partitioned into cells

JADED

Transfusion

inspiration