Titlebook: Decision and Game Theory for Security; 11th International C Quanyan Zhu,John S. Baras,Juntao Chen Conference proceedings 2020 Springer Natu

能干

書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security影響因子(影響力)




書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security影響因子(影響力)學科排名




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書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security網(wǎng)絡公開度學科排名




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書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security被引頻次學科排名




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書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security年度引用學科排名




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Interdict

Learning and Planning in the Feature Deception Problemender’s loss by misleading the attacker to make suboptimal decisions. In order to formally reason about deception, we introduce the ., a domain-independent model and present a learning and planning framework for finding the optimal deception strategy, taking into account the adversary’s preferences

Osmosis

Counteract

paroxysm

incision

Exploiting Bounded Rationality in Risk-Based Cyber Camouflage Games optimize a deceptive defense based on camouflaging network and system attributes, have shown effective numerical results on simulated data. However, these models possess a fundamental drawback due to the assumption that an attempted attack is always successful—as a direct consequence of the decepti

incision

珊瑚

insolence

Abjure